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FEDERAL COURTS-Petitioner under State Indictment
as a Recidivist May Attack the Constitutionality of a Former
Federal Conviction by a Motion in the Nature of Coram
Nobis When His Release From Custody Prevents Him From
Using the Applicable Habeas Corpus Remedy (28 U.S.C.
2255).
INTRODUCTION

In 1961 Lawrence Flanagan was given a two year suspended sentence after he was convicted on a guilty plea of transporting a stolen
motor vehicle across state lines in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2312. At his
trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, Flanagan waived representation by counsel.
Approximately four years after Flanagan's suspended sentence had
expired, he was indicted in Nassau County, New York for the felony
of possession of a dangerous weapon; except for Flanagan's prior
federal conviction, his New York crime would have been a misdemeanor. For this reason, on October 3, 1968, Flanagan moved the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under
28 U.S.C. 22551 to vacate his prior conviction. Flanagan's motion
challenged the constitutionality of his conviction on the grounds that
he had not intelligently waived his right to counsel, and that he had not
knowingly entered a plea of guilty. Accepting his second contention,
the court vacated his conviction after finding that his guilty plea had
been involuntary. Subsequently, however, on motion of the United
States Attorney, the court vacated its prior order setting aside Flanagan's
conviction, because it found that the requirement of section 2255 that
the petitioner be in custody had not been met. Nevertheless, after
Flanagan renewed his motion to vacate, the district court held that,
although the custody requirement precluded treating Flanagan's motion under section 2255, relief could be granted by issuance of a writ of
error coram nobis.2 The court characterized federal coram nobis as
1. 28 U.S.C. 2255 (1964):

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court

established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that

the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sen-

tence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to
collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside

or correct the sentence.
2. In support of its decision, the Flanagan court cited United States v. Morgan,
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a remedy having two broad restrictions:
[Coram nobis] will be bounded on the one hand by the advancing
coverage of section 2255 and on the other hand by the constitutional doctrine that requires this court to decide only those cases
where parties' interests are actually at stake.3
This comment will explore three problems posed by the court's delineation of federal coram nobis4 as a remedy having the two indicated
restrictions. The first concerns the former uses of coram nobis which
have been made unnecessary by the "advancing coverage" of section
2255, the probable limits of this expansion, and the consequent remaining uses of coram nobis. The second problem relates to those
"substantial interests" that will support a motion in the nature of
coram nobis, and whether these are the same as the substantial interests
that will support a motion under section 2255. The third problem involves the applicability of other historical limitations on the ancient writ
and relates particularly to the question of whether coram nobis now
has additional restrictions besides the two identified by the Flanagan
court.
ADVANCING COVERAGE OF SECTION

2255

In the past, federal coram nobis was used principally to permit attacks upon a conviction after the petitioner had completed serving his
sentence, 5 or to allow a prisoner incarcerated under consecutive sentences to attack a sentence he would begin serving in the future. 6
346 U.S. 502 (1954), which held that federal courts have authority under the All Writs
Act (28 U.S.C. 1651(a) ) to issue writs of coram nobis when the absence of custody
makes sect'on 2255 inapplicable. The All Writs Act reads as follows: "The Supreme
Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
3. United States v. Flanagan, 305 F. Supp. 325, 328 (E.D. Va. 1969). The
section 2255 boundary to coram nobis relief requires that, in order for coram nobis
to lie, section 2255 must be unavailable. See Tivis v. United States, 302 F. Supp.
579 (N.D. Tex. 1969), where the court held that a mislabeled application for coram
nobis relief by a petitioner who was entitled to proceed under section 2255 must be
treated as having been properly brought under that section. The boundary "which
requires that parties' interests be at stake" is commonly referred to as justiciability. A
subdivision of justiciability which often becomes an issue in coram nobis cases is the
doctrine of "mootness." Thus, although a petitioner might have been a proper party in
interest at one time, subsequent events may so change the posture of the case that he
no longer has a sufficiently personal interest to satisfy the constitutional requirement of
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 that "The judicial Power shall extend to all cases [and] controversies. . . ." The government has often contended that the release of a coram
nobis applicant from custody moots his petition.
4. It should be noted that this comment will not deal with the uses of coram
nobis to make post conviction constitutional challenges in state courts. For a discussion of the frequently dissimilar status of state coram nobis, see 80 HARV. L. REV.
422, 430-431 (1966).
5. See, e.g., Igo v. United States, 303 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1962) (relief denied
on the merits, however).
6. Thomas v. United States, 271 F.2d 500 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Migdol v. United
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Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Peyton v.
Rowe,' a petitioner seeking to attack a future sentence was precluded
from doing so under section 2255, because he was not in custody as the
term was then understood. Custody was viewed as comprehending
only sentences then being served, not sentences to commence in the
future. 8 Since the decision in Rowe, federal habeas corpus9 is now
available to attack a consecutive sentence which does not begin to run
until the uncontested sentence the defendant is serving has expired.
In Rowe a state prisoner had been convicted of rape, and then had
pleaded guilty to a subsequent indictment charging him with "felonious
abduction with intent to defile." He was sentenced to a twenty year
term on this conviction, the sentence to commence at the termination

of his sentence for rape.

After exhausting available state remedies,

he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to set aside his second
conviction, alleging that it violated the fifth and sixth amendments of
the United States Constitution. The United States District Court for
States, 298 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1961); Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 401 (5th
Cir. 1965); Deckard v. United States, 81 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1967).
7. 391 U.S. 5 (1968).
8. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934).
However, following the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Morgan, supra., note 2, which held that federal
district courts have power to grant motions in the nature of a writ of error coram
nobis under 28 U.S.C. 1651(a), many district courts avoided the custody requirement
by treating the petition under section 2255 as one for a writ of error coram nobis.
See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, supra., note 6, and cases cited thereafter.
9. Federal habeas corpus is regulated by statute at 28 U.S.C. 2241-2254 and by
section 2255.

See C.

WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs,

at 178

(1963). In Rowe, the section at issue was 2241(c)(3):
The Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless-He is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States...
In contrast to section 2255 and federal coram nobis, which are available only to attack
federal convictions, section 2241(c)(3) as implemented by section 2254 may be used
to challenge the constitutionality of a state conviction. Section 2255 differs further
from section 2241 in that a motion under section 2255 is directed to the sentencing
court, whereas one under 2241 is made in a district court located in the state which
convicted the petitioner or as provided in section 2241(d) if the state contains more
than one judicial district.
Apart from these two differences, section 2255 is considered to be the equivalent
of 2241. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952): "The sole purpose
[of enacting section 22551 was to minimize the difficulties encountered in habeas
corpus hearings by affording the same rights in another and more convenient forum."
In particular, custody as used in section 2255 is considered to have the same meaning
as custody in § 2241. Cf. Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418 (1959); 57 Nw.
U.L. REV. 467, 472 (1962). The sections are identical in another respect. Since
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 226-227 (1969) was decided, the right of a
petitioner to challenge the constitutionality of his federal conviction by way of section
2255 is no less extensive than the right of a petitioner to challenge the constitutionality
of his state conviction. In view of this equivalence, it will be assumed in this comment
that the increasing availability of federal habeas corpus to challenge the constitutionality
of a state conviction implies a like increase in the availability of section 2255 to
challenge a federal conviction. Furthermore, although the terminology in this area
varies, in this comment the term habeas corpus should be taken to include actions
under section 2255.
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the Western District of Virginia dismissed the petition, holding that
since the petitioner had not yet begun to serve the allegedly invalid
sentence, he was not in "custody" within the meaning of section 2241.
The court of appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed this
reversal. 10 The Court held that "[C]ustody comprehends [a prisoner's] status for the entire duration of his imprisonment"; and, that the
term custody should embrace "[The aggregate of the sentences imposed. . . ."I The Court further justified its liberal construction of
the term "custody" on public policy grounds, saying: (1) passage of
time will increase the difficulty of adjudicating fact issues in the habeas
corpus proceeding and any subsequent retrial that may be required;
and (2) the basic purpose of the writ is to provide swift review of un2
lawful restraints on liberty.'
Although Rowe held only that a prisoner could attack a future
sentence if he were incarcerated under consecutive sentences entered
by the same court, the decision has been construed to entitle a person
incarcerated under a sentence imposed by one state to attack a future
sentence which was imposed by the courts of another state.' 3 Similarly, state prisoners have been permitted to attack future federal sentences by way of section 2255 prior to expiration of their unchal14
lenged state sentences.
Nevertheless, as the Flanagan decision indicates, coram nobis retains its vitality as a post conviction remedy to attack a conviction
after the sentence has been served. There are, however, two contexts
in which a petitioner may attack a federal conviction by way of section
2255 after his release from prison. In the first, a released prisoner who
is on parole is considered to be in custody for purposes of federal habeas
corpus; 5 in the second, a prisoner who has been sentenced as an
10. 391 U.S. 545, 57-58 (1968).
11. 391 U.S. at, 64.
12. 391 U.S., at 62, 63.
13. United States ex rel Van Scoten v. Commonwealth of Pa., 404 F.2d 767
(E.D. Pa. 1968); Word v. North Carolina, 406 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1969); George v.
Nelson, 410 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1969).
An interesting and unresolved question
raised by these decisions relates to the proper court in which to file the petition.
Word, supra., held that the district court in the district where the future sentence is
to be served is the proper forum. The opposite position was taken by the court in
George, supra, which held that the petition should be filed in the district where the

petitioner was at that time incarcerated.

Several problems are raised by both these

approaches. See 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 845 (1969)
In any event, these decisions may
represent an extension of the decision in Peyton v. Rowe, supra., note 7, since the
Court's argument that the petitioner was effectively "in custody" for the aggregate of
his sentences seems less compelling when the two sentences are imposed by different
jurisdictions. The policy of early adjudication underlying the Peyton decision, however,

is just as compelling when the future sentence has been imposed by another sovereign.
14. Kemplen v. United States, mem. decis. No. 12, 692 (4th Cir. April 21, 1969).
15. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
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habitual offender on the basis of a constitutionally invalid prior conviction has also been able to attack that conviction by way of habeas
corpus.' 6
In Flanagan the petitioner was not actually incarcerated as an habitual offender; he was merely threatened with such incarceration on
the basis of his challenged prior conviction. In the court's view, the
mere threat of increased incarceration on the basis of a constitutionally invalid earlier conviction did not constitute custody within the
meaning of that term as used in section 2255. What is required, stated
the court, is "some restraint greater than continuing disabilities"' 7
at the time a petitioner files his petition for section 2255 relief.
The court rejected petitioner's contention that the Supreme Court's
decision in Carafas v. LaVallee"s established that a habeas corpus applicant can meet the custody requirement merely by showing that he
suffers from continuing restraints upon his civil freedoms as a consequence of his past conviction. The Flanagan court interpreted
Carafas to require only that the applicant be in custody when the
petition is filed, and indicated that the "continuing disabilities" referred to by the Carafas court were relied upon only to overcome the
government's contention that the case had become moot when petitioner completed serving his sentence after having filed his habeas
corpus petition."9
Other district courts have given Carafas the same reading as the
Flanagan court.2 0 There is, however, district court authority to the
contrary. 2 ' The court in Glover v. North Carolina held that Carafas
should be interpreted to mean that continuing civil disabilities which
flow from a conviction place a petitioner in custody for purposes of
the federal habeas corpus statute. The court stated:
It is not actual physical custody during service of sentence that
gives standing in habeas corpus; it is instead the restraint on lib16. Some lower federal courts have used language implying that the attack should
have the effect of moving up the commencement dates of future valid sentences so as
to provide for immediate release. See Tucker v. Peyton, 357 F.2d 115, 118 (4th Cir.
1966); Strouth v. Peyton, 404 F.2d 537, 538 n.3 (4th Cir. 1968). The current
authority of these restrictions, however, seems to have been undercut by the decision
in Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 67 (1968), which makes clear that immediate release
is not required. It appears that the attack need only have the effect of moving up
petitioner's discharge date. Cf. United States v. Wilkins, 303 F.2d 883, 884 (2d Cir.
1962); United States v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1964).
17. United States v. Flanagan, supra, note 3, at 327.
18. 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
19. The continuing disabilities were sufficient to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article 111,
section 2. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968).
20. Bullock v. Peyton, 299 F. Supp. 936, 938 (W.D. Va. 1969).
21. Glover v. State of North Carolina, 301 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. N.C. 1969).
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erty, whether physical or of a more subtle nature. .

.

. Should one

experience a substantial restraint on his liberty as a result of a
conviction that has been fully satisfied, his standing in habeas
corpus should not hinge upon whether he is on parole, is eligible
for parole, or has instituted his application while he was in physical
custody even though unconditionally released before a final decision was rendered by the court. Instead his standing hinges
upon the substantiality
of the restraints that flow from the convic22
tion he attacks.
This statement of the court, though perhaps a desirable further broadening of the custody concept, does not accurately reflect the holding in
Carafas. As the Flanagan court indicated, the Supreme Court in
Carafas drew a sharp distinction between disabilities that will avoid
constitutional or technical mootness and restraints that will constitute
custody.3 To the extent, however, that other federal courts follow
the lead of Glover in blurring this distinction, federal habeas corpus
will increasingly become the primary method of attacking a past conviction after discharge, regardless of whether or not petitioner is presently imprisoned as an habitual offender. In that event, coram nobis
will have no function as a post conviction remedy, unless its scope is
24
expanded to relieve against mere moral stigma.
The Glover Court's decision is unlikely to gain widespread acceptance, in view of its obvious mixing of the mootness and custody issues.
For the near future, then, federal coram nobis will probably retain
its vitality as a vehicle for making a post conviction attack upon a completed sentence when the petitioner is threatened with incarceration as
an habitual offender as a result of that sentence.
Federal coram nobis may also prove useful as a post conviction
remedy when the petitioner suffers only civil disabilities. Its usefulness for this purpose, however, will be limited by the case or controversy restriction.
CASE OR CONTROVERSY

The theory underlying the concept of standing is that a party upon
whom a decision will have little effect lacks the necessary incentive to
vigorously present his case.2 5 Halfhearted presentation of a case, it is
22. Id., at 368.
23. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968).
24. See the discussion at paoes 334 and 335, infra.
25. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968), quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204 (1962): "The 'gist of the question of standing' is whether the party seeking
relief has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."'
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felt, will lead the courts to establish erroneous precedents.2 6 An important question to be settled in coram nobis proceedings is whether
civil disabilities and/or moral stigma will be deemed to inflict a sufficiently cognizable injury upon the petitioner so as to afford him
standing to sue.
The Flanagan court held only that a contingent increased criminal
liability was a substantial enough interest to satisfy the case or controversy requirement.27 The court expressly refused to decide whether
civil disabilities were sufficient to confer standing, though it acknowl28
edged that other courts have held that they do.
To be contrasted with coram nobis actions are habeas corpus proceedings, where civil disabilities have been held by the United States
Supreme Court to avoid mootness:
It is clear that petitioner's cause is not moot. In consequence
of his conviction, he cannot engage in certain businesses; he cannot serve as an official of a labor union for a specified period of
time; he cannot vote in any election held in New York State; he
cannot serve as a juror. Because of these "disabilities or burdens
[which] may flow from" petitioner's conviction, he has "a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction
which survives the
' 29
satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him."
For this conclusion that civil disabilities present a cognizable "case or
controversy" in a habeas corpus proceeding, the Court cited United
States v. Morgan,80 the landmark coram nobis decision. There seems,
clearly, no valid reason to apply a different constitutional standard to
coram nobis actions than to habeas corpus proceedings.8 1
Although civil disabilities should give rise to a cognizable "case or
controversy" in both habeas corpus (assuming the statutory custody requirement is met) and coram nobis proceedings, mere moral stigma
seems unlikely to overcome the standing barrier.12 No cases squarely
26. 103 U. PA. L. REV. 772, 773 (1955).
27. United States v. Flanagan, supra note 3. Accord United States v. Forlano, 319
F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1963).
28. United States v. Flanagan, supra note 3, at 330.
29. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968).
30. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954), cited by the Carajas court at 391
U.S. 234, 238 (1968).
31. Even prior to the decision in Carafas civil disabilities were considered to give
standing in a coram nobis proceeding. See United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180
(3d Cir. 1963); Kyle v. United States, 288 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1961), holding that
deprivation of the right to vote entitles a petitioner to use coram nobis to invalidate a

prior criminal conviction.

32. Cf. St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 43 (1943).
Most federal court
decisions considering whether coram nobis applications have become moot contain
statements that moral stigma alone will not give petitioner standing. See, e.g., United
States v. National Plastikwear Fashions, Inc., 368 F.2d 845, 846 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.

den., 386 U.S. 976 (1967).
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hold that the stigma flowing from a felony conviction in itself is sufficient to refute the government's objection that a petitioner's release
moots his case. There has been, however, a suggestion that it should.
In a dissent in Parkerv. Ellis," then Chief Justice Warren stated:
Conviction of a felony imposes a status upon a person which not
only makes him vulnerable to future sanctions through new civil
disability statutes, but which also seriously affects his reputation
and economic opportunity.8
Chief Justice Warren's conclusion that moral stigma should give standing does not contravene the policy underlying the "case or controversy"
restriction of Article III, section Is'
Even if a petitioner is unaffected
by a civil disability statute, the "label of ex-con" is likely to have a
disabling effect upon him. For example, he may be denied a government occupation requiring a security clearance or other position of
trust. Thus, a decision of the court invalidating a past conviction will
have an immediate practical effect apart from its general abstract sig33. Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 577-594 (1960) (Warren, dissenting).
34. Id., at 593-594. This often quoted passage was cited by the court in Mathis v.
United States, 369 F.2d 43, at 46 n.13 (4th Cir. 1966), which did not, however, involve
the question of whether moral stigma should give rise to a case or controversy. The
petitioner in Mathis, who was serving a Florida state sentence, made a coram nobis
attack upon an earlier federal conviction. Sentence for this conviction was to commence at the expiration of his state sentence, and federal officials had accordingly
placed a detainer with Florida state officials. The district court had denied the petition on the ground that the petitioner was suffering no "present restraint on liberty."
Mathis v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 116, 122 (E.D. N.C. 1965). The appellate
court reversed, holding that the federal detainer constituted a "present adverse effect."
369 F.2d at 48. Notwithstanding this finding, in the course of its opinion, the appellate
court stated that ".

.

. it would be anomalous at this date to read into coram nobis a

stringent requirement that the petitioner show a 'present adverse effect?'"
Id. It
is questionable whether the adverse effects of which the court spoke went to the issue
of standing. The district court, after a murky analysis in which it analogized coram
nobis cases to federal habeas corpus custody cases, seems to have attempted to establish
in coram nobis proceedings a cognate to the custody requirement of section 2255. The
appellate court's decision, therefore, might simply be construed as the correction of the
district court's erroneous attempt to create a new restriction on coram nobis relief.
However, the Flanagan court found a broader meaning in the decision as follows:
"The Mathis decision contains language .. . which would lend support to the claim
that the desire to be relieved of a felony conviction gives a petitioner sufficient interest
in the outcome of coram nobis litigation to create a cognizable case or controversy."
United States V. Flanagan, 305 F. Supp. 325, 330 (E.D. Va., 1969). Although this
reading of the language in Mathis seems questionable, the Mathis decision is nevertheless significant if only for its holding that a state prisoner against whom a federal detainer has been placed may attack the conviction underlying that detainer through the
use of coram nobis.
35. CI. 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 467, 475 (1962). Moreover, allowing moral stigma to
overcome mootness would not radically depart from prior practice, as federal courts
have frequently permitted a relatively slight showing of disability to give standing. See
e.g., United States v. Gernie, 228 F. Supp. 329, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), where the mere
possibility that prison authorities might subtract time served on a prior invalid sentence
from the sentence the petitioner was then serving was held to avoid mootness; and,
United States v. DiMartini, 118 F. Supp. 601, (S.D.N.Y. 1953), where the mootness
obstacle was avoided by a finding that an habitual offender might get damages if he
demonstrated his innocence at retail.
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nificance as a precedent. Such an "impact of actuality" 6 is the essence
of a case or controversy under Article III.
Should the mootness restriction eventually be relaxed so that courts
permit coram nobis attacks on the strength of moral stigma alone, a
question will still remain as to whether other restrictions limit the function of the writ as an alternative to section 2255 when there is no
custody.
Is CORAM NOBIS COEXTENSIVE WITH SECTION

2255

ABSENT CUSTODY?

The answer to the question of whether other limitations restrict the
availability of federal coram nobis to make a post conviction attack requires a brief glance at the writ's history. Coram nobis originated in
equity where it was sued initially in civil proceedings. 7 It was available to attack only errors of fact not appearing on the record and unknown to the court;3 8 the error of fact must have been undiscoverable
by due diligence;"9 a petitioner invoking the writ was required to allege
his innocence; 40 his petition might be defeated by laches; 4 1 and coram
nobis relief was considered to be extraordinary in nature. 42 It has
been observed that these impediments were justified by the strong
policy favoring finality in civil judgments. 3
Nevertheless, these restrictions generally accompanied the writ when
it was extended to relieve against criminal convictions." In the United
States, however, federal coram nobis has undergone extensive judicial
4
redefinition since the Supreme Court in United States v. Morgan
sanctioned its use as a post conviction remedy when section 2255 is unavailable. The question, then, is whether this process has removed
these historical limitations so that coram nobis is now equivalent to section 2255 absent custody. The question has two principal facets: 46
(1) Must a coram nobis applicant successfully meet more defenses than
36.

Cf. Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARv. L.

REV.

1002, 1006

(1923).
37. Briggs, 'Coram Nobis'-ls It Either an Available or the Most Satisfactory
Post-Conviction Remedy to Test Constitutionality in Criminal Proceedings? 17 MONT.
L. REV. 160, 172 (1956).

38. 55 GEO. L.J.851, 865 (1967).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 63 YALE L.J. 115, 121 (1953).

42. See note 38 supra, at 865.
43.
44.

See note 41 supra, at 119.
Cf. Briggs, supra, note 37.

It would perhaps be more accurate to say that the

writ did not lose its restrictions when it was extended to relieve against criminal
convictions.
45.

346 U.S. 502 (1954).

46. Two other related aspects of the problem concern the procedural rights of a

coram nobis petitioner and allocation of the burden of proof.

Though there exists

uncertainty regarding the answer to the procedural problem (See 55 GEO. L.J. 851, 869
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his counterpart in a habeas corpus proceeding? and (2) May a petitioner make the same constitutional attacks in a coram nobis proceedig as he could make under section 2255?
Neither of these questions has been definitively resolved by Morgan
or its progeny. The majority opinion in Morgan, considered alone,
tends to suggest that coram nobis was envisioned as only a limited alternative to section 2255. Although the Court explicitly rejected the
common law restriction that coram nobis lay solely to present facts
unknown to the court at the time of conviction,17 the court made other
statements implying that coram nobis was to have a narrow scope:
there must be "sound reasons . . . for failure to seek appropriate earlier
relief;" 48 and, post conviction attacks "should be allowed through this
extraordinary remedy only under circumstances compelling such action
to achieve justice."49
The restrictive force of this language is weakened, however, when
it is construed in connection with what was actually decided. The decision implicitly eliminated a laches requirement, as petitioner attacked
a conviction entered fifteen years earlier without attempting any explanation of the delay. 5° Likewise, the Court indirectly removed an "allegation of innocence" obstacle, as the petitioner asserted the constitutional
invalidity of his conviction without alleging his innocence of the crime."'
(1969) ), coram nobis and habeas corpus appear to be procedurally the same. For
example, when faced with the question of the right of a coram nobis petitioner to an
evidentiary hearing, Owensby v. United States, 353 F.2d 412, 417 (10th Cir. 1965)
held that ". . . the issue as to whether a hearing should be held should be resolved in
the same manner as it is for petitions under 28 U.S.C. 2255." In both section 2255
and coram nobis proceedings, the petition will be summarily dismissed if it contains
only conclusory statements rather than allegations of fact. Accardi v. United States,
379 F.2d 312, 313 (2d Cir. 1967) (section 2255 petition summarily dismissed); United
States v. Carlino, 400 F.2d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 1968) (coram nobis petition summarily
dismissed). The relationship between the remedies with respect to other rights has
not been settled. There seems, however, to be no apparent reason to hold that they
are procedurally identical with respect to a petitioner's right to an evidentiary hearing,
but different with respect to other procedures.
The remedies are additionally alike in that both habeas corpus and coram nobis
petitioners bear the burden of rebutting the presumption of validity which favors the
contested conviction. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938); United States
v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 512 (1954)
However, if the record is silent on the relevant
constitutional question, as where it fails to disclose whether petitioner was represented
by counsel, this presumption will be neutralized and the petitioner may himself become
the beneficiary of a presumption against waiver of constitutional rights. Farnsworth
v. United States, 232 F.2d 59, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
47. 346 U.S. at 511.
48. Id. at 512.
49. Id. at 511.
50. Lower federal courts applying Morgan have interpreted the decision as overruling a laches restriction. Haywood v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y.
1954); United States v. DiMartini, 118 F. Supp. 601, 602 (S.D. N.Y. 1953); United
States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1964); Farnsworth v. United States, supra note
46.
51. Similarly, Morgan has been interpreted as removing this restriction. Haywood
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The apparently restrictive effect of the requirement that there be "sound
reasons for failure to seek earlier relief' is lessened when placed alongside the dissent's objection that defendant "attempted no explanation of
the prolonged delay. ' 5 Thus, to the extent that the due diligence requirement is still viable, its impeding effect may be somewhat insubstantial when viewed in light of the facts present in Morgan.5"
It is still necessary, however, in a coram nobis proceeding to demonstrate that such extraordinary action is compelled to achieve justice. 4
It is as yet uncertain when the extraordinary nature of the writ will
operate to bar a constitutional attack.5 5 Morgan held that deprivation
of a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel calls for extraordinary relief, and the majority of the lower federal court cases following
Morgan have involved the same constitutional defect.5 6 A showing
that a guilty plea was involuntary has also frequently been considered
to automatically entitle a coram nobis petitioner to extraordinary relief; 57 and at least one court has permitted a petitioner to invalidate
his conviction on the ground that the mandatory registration provision
of the statute he violated was applied to him so as to infringe upon his

v. United States, supra. note 50; United States v. DiMartini, supra. note 50.
Contra Bateman v. United States, 277 F.2d 65, 68 (8th Cir. 1960). See also discussion at pages 340-341, infra.
52. 346 U.S. at 514 (1954) (Minton, dissenting).
53. The significance of the due diligence restriction appears to depend in part upon
the ground of the constitutional attack. Where the petitioner claimed he was deprived
of counsel, Farnsworth v. United States, supra note 46, at 63 held that he ". . . should
not be precluded from relief because he cannot satisfy a court that he had good cause
for any delay in seeking it." Contra Kiger v. United States, 315 F.2d 778, 779 (7th
Cir. 1963), where failure to exercise due diligence defeated a petitioner's contention
that his fifth amendment due process rights were violated by the government's knowing
use of perjured testimony. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Fay v. Noia,
377 U.S. 391 (1963) may be significant in this regard. There, the Court indicated
that a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 would lie in the absence of a showing
that petitioner deliberately and knowingly by-passed other appropriate avenues by
which he could have attacked the tainted conviction. A criterion akin to this deliberate
by-passing standard may come to be applied to coram nobis petitions, regardless of the
constitutional basis of attack.
54. See note 49, supra.
55. See note 38, supra at 868.
56. Haywood v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); United States
v. Forlano, 319 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1963); Igo v. United States, 303 F.2d 317 (10th
Cir. 1962); United States v. DiMartini, 118 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. N.Y. 1953); Johnson v.
United States, 344 F.2d 401, 411 (5th Cir. 1965) (held, coram nobis may be used
to assert the invalidity of a contempt conviction on the ground that the petitioner was
not afforded representation by counsel). 74 HARV. L. REV. 1615, 1619 n.35 (1961).
57. Holloway v. United States, 393 F.2d 731, 732 (9th Cir., 1968); Thomas v.
United States, 271 F.2d 500 (D.C. Cir. 1959). Contra Young v. United States, 337
F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1964).
Young upheld the summary dismissal of a petition
challenging a conviction on the grounds of involuntary guilty plea and lack of counsel.
The court dismissed the somewhat inartfully drawn petition with the statement that the
circumstances did not call for extraordinary relief. Although the decision can perhaps
be supported on the ground that the petitioner made mere conclusory allegations, the
court's failure to so justify its holding appears to be a deviation from common practice.
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fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.5 s It would seem,
then, that with respect to those fundamental constitutional defects necessitating automatic reversal of a conviction, 59 the extraordinary character of coram nobis will not limit its effectiveness as an alternative to
section 2255.
Although a petitioner for a writ of coram nobis can make the same
challenges to fundamental constitutional violations as an applicant
under section 2255, it is unclear whether the extraordinary character of coram nobis will preclude its use to make other constitutional
attacks which can be made by way of section 2255. Though some
authorities view the remedies as having the same substantive scope,6"
it must be remembered that there is no closed catalogue of grounds
which may be asserted in a habeas corpus proceeding. 6' Furthermore, it has never been held that an expansion of section 2255 to
permit a new constitutional attack necessarily implies a comparable
expansion of coram nobis.
Currently, the most important unresolved area is fourth amendment
violations. There is existing authority that deprivations of fourth
amendment rights are unassailable in a coram nobis proceeding.6 2 But
such decisions were rendered at a time when fourth amendment challenges were not universally permitted under section 2255.3 Recently
the Supreme Court in Kaufman v. United States64 resolved the problem
in favor of allowing a petitioner to use section 2255 to claim he was
convicted on the basis of unconstitutionally seized evidence." In re58. Deckard v. United States, 381 F.2d 77, 81 (8th Cir. 1967).
59. The rule of automatic reversal requires the invalidation of a conviction regardless of whether it is otherwise overwhelmingly supported by constitutionally untainted evidence. The rule applies to correct such constitutional violations as use of a
coerced confession and deprivation of right to counsel. To be distinguished from
these "fundamental" constitutional errors are others such as knowing use of perjured
testimony contrary to fifth amendment due process and introduction of illegally seized
evidence in violation of the fourth amendment. These constitutional infringements do
not automatically necessitate reversal of the conviction if the prosecution can satisfy
the court that the error was harmless. See generally W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, AND J.
CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS, at 612-614 (1967);
and Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due
Process Values, 61 MICH. L. REV. 219, 241-242 (1962).
60. 74 HAv. L. REV. 1615, 1619 (1961); Cf. Williams v. Peyton, 372 F.2d 216,
220 (4th Cir. 1967); Contra. 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1164, 1176 (1966).
61. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963): "[Habeas Corpus] is not

now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to
achieve its grand purpose-the protection of individuals against erosion of their right
to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty."
62. Moon v. United States, 272 F.2d 530, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
63. Thorton v. United States, 368 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
64. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
65. Id. at 231. In so holding the Court seems to have put to rest contentions that
the scope of constitutional attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255 was different from that under
2241 and 2254 by a prisoner in state custody.
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jecting the view of those federal courts which had denied the use of
section 22555 to press a fourth amendment challenge, the Court stated
that:
The provision of federal collateral remedies rest . . fundamentally upon a recognition that adequate protection of constitutional rights relating to the criminal trial process requires the continuing availability of a mechanism for relief . . . . [A]pplication
of the [rule of exclusion] is not made to turn on the existence of a
possibility of innocence; rather, exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is deemed necessary to protect the right of all citizens, not
merely the citizen on60 trial, to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
The court's use of the broad term "federal collateral remedies" and
the emphasis placed upon protecting "the right of all citizens" suggests that fourth amendment claims should now be cognizable in a
coram nobis action.
Even if the scope of coram nobis expands at the same pace as that
of section 2255 to relieve against deprivation of constitutional rights
which have not been held to be fundamental, 67 there remains the possibility that common law obstacles may reappear to more narrowly limit
its availability. This possibility is suggested by the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States
v. Keough.68 Keough sought to invalidate his conviction after he had
completed serving his sentence on the ground that the prosecution had
failed to disclose evidence to his defense counsel at trial. After discussing what standards should govern a prosecutor's duty to disclose when
relief is sought by way of habeas corpus, the court took a restrictive
view of coram nobis relief with the statement that:
On a coram nobis petition such as this, it is only when the court
concludes that the undisclosed evidence would have permitted the
defendant so to present his case that he would probably have
raised a reasonable doubt as to his guilt in the mind of a conscientious juror that justice compels the invalidation of the conviction. 69

The court justified creation of this approximate equivalent of the common law "allegation of innocence" restriction on three grounds: (1)
the nonfundamental character of the challenged constitutional defect;"0 (2) the extraordinary nature of coram nobis;7 ' and (3) the
66. Id.,
67. See
68. 391
69. id.,
70. Id.

340

at 226, 229.
note 63, supra.
F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968).
at 148.
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absence of any incentive 72to reprosecute Keough because he had already served his sentence.
The real grounds of the decision seem to have been lack of incentive
to reprosecute and the nonfundamental character of the defect. This
is apparent from the careful distinction the court made between coram
nobis attacks upon completed sentences and those upon future sentences; in the court's view, section 2255 standards would govern when
coram nobis was used to attack a future sentence.7 3 In light of the
increasing availability of habeas corpus to attack a conviction which
has caused the petitioner to be incarcerated as a recidivist,7 4 it is difficult to understand why the lack of incentive to reprosecute should in75
voke the "extraordinary nature" limitation upon coram nobis relief.
Moreover, creation of an additional "reasonable doubt as to guilt" 78
obstacle to post conviction relief when the petitioner has completed
serving his sentence disregards the essential purpose of having collateral
remedies available to correct violations of constitutional rights. As indicated in Kaufman v. United States,7 7 "[C]ollateral relief . . . contributes to the present vitality of all constitutional rights whether or not
they bear on the integrity of the fact finding process. '78 Encumbering this "collateral relief" with restrictions bottomed on the prosecution's lack of incentive to reprosecute would sap that "present vitality."
A coram nobis applicant should face no other obstacles than his counterpart in a habeas corpus proceeding regardless of whether the alleged
constitutional error is deemed "fundamental," particularly since it is
questionable whether a deprivation of constitutional rights can ever be
properly classified as "nonfundamental".
Nevertheless, the Keough decision evidences a judicial disposition
to seize upon the "extraordinary nature" limitation to restrict relief
when the constitutional transgression is not considered to require automatic reversal. To the extent that such efforts become more frequent,
the growth of coram nobis as a post conviction remedy will lag behind
that of habeas corpus. In the process of attempting to define what is
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id., at 148-149 n.9.
74. See note 6 supra., and discussion at pp. 330-332.
75. Cf. Pearce v. North Carolina, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (held, if a petitioner is
reconvicted after he has successfully attacked his prior conviction, he is entitled under
the fifth amendment to have time previously served subtracted from his new sentence).
It is notable that the Pearce decision made no distinction between the various forms
of post conviction attack.
76. See notes 40 and 51, supra.
77. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
78. Id., at 229.
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constitutionally "nonextraordinary," courts may revive old common
law impediments,7 9 notwithstanding their irrelevance to the writ's modern function as a means of collaterally attacking the constitutionality
of a criminal conviction. 0 Until coram nobis is frankly made the
equivalent of section 2255 absent custody, confusion surrounding its
common law limitations is likely to make it a less than coextensive avenue of attack."'
CONCLUSION

A final question to be faced is how coram nobis may continue to
play an active role in the federal system of collateral relief. Its essential function has been to correct constitutional errors when the absence
of custody makes section 2255 inappropriate. In recent years, the
occasions for resorting to the writ have decreased as courts have broadened the definition of custody to permit challenges under section 2255
which formerly could only be made by way of coram nobis.
Some courts have attempted to otherwise limit the writ's scope by
applying restrictions which have their origin in the equity courts of
medieval England, where coram nobis initially functioned as an extraordinary vehicle for reopening civil judgments.8 2 To the extent that the
modem version of the writ is intended to be an integral part of the
scheme of "federal collateral remedies" which are available to criminal defendants, its purpose is best fulfilled by adopting the view taken in
United States v. Flanagan that
This scope of use will be bounded on the one hand by the advancing coverage of section 2255 and on the other hand by the
constitutional doctrine that requires this Court to decide only
those cases where parties' interests are actually at stake. 8
Although this approach may include some historical imperfections, it
is submitted that it is the most desirable one.
THOMAS D. RAFTER

79.

80.
which
81.
82.
83.

342

66 COLUm. L. REV. 1164, 1179 (1966).

Cf. 63 YALE L.J. 115, 120 (1953): "The only issue which is relevant and
the petitioner should have to prove is that he was deprived of due process."
See note 79, supra.
See discussion of Keough, supra., note 68, at pages 340-341.
United States v. Flanagan,305 F. Supp. 325, 328 (ED. Va. 1969).

